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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Ever increasing demand for food, electricity and domestic water use due to rapid 
growth in population has remained a key challenge for Pakistan since the 1950s. The 
country has invested heavily in water engineering projects to establish the world’s largest 
gravity-driven irrigation network on the Indus [Bandaragoda (2006); Bengali (2009)]. 
Besides fulfilling a significant proportion of the country’s energy demand from hydro-
power installations, the system irrigates about 14 million hectares of farmlands and 
supports agriculture sector to contribute about 21 percent of the GDP, 60 percent of the 
exports and 45 percent of the labour force [Bhutta (2006); Pakistan (2012)]. Amidst its 
development, the elaborated irrigation facility has left a deep footprint on productivity 
and environment of the basin itself in the form of the rising levels of water-logging and 
salinity and the degradation of deltaic ecology [Briscoe and Qamar (2009); Memon and 
Thapa (2011)]. By the 1960s, every year about 40,000 hectares of fertile farmlands were 
turning into wastelands because of water-logging and salinity in the basin [Bhutta (2006); 
Mulk (2009); Qureshi, et al. (2008)]. Therefore, the country had no option but to develop 
a remedial drainage network of thousands of kilometres of drains and numerous tube 
wells parallel to the existing irrigation infrastructure. 
Investment in the irrigation infrastructure had been rationalised based on the 
assumption that it will pave the way for social change in the country [Haines (2011)]. 
However, once the major phase of irrigation development completed, the policy-makers 
and the World Bank (with its crucial role in the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, and 
subsequent development of the basin) sensed the political economy of the agrarian 
society; within which the irrigation infrastructure was unable to recover even a small 
fraction of its operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. The politically dominant feudal 
lords who possessed the major share of farmlands, were not only interfering in the 
everyday affairs of irrigation management [Mustafa (2002a)], but could also influence the 
legislature and enjoy water subsidies in the name of small landholders [Faisal (2009); 
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Nabi, et al. (1986)]. Add-ins were the ethos and colonial legacies of the hydraulic 
bureaucrats who kept themselves isolated from the general public and had no option but 
to connive with the feudal lords and operate the system at their will [Mustafa (2002a)]. 
Numerous policy and operational problems, such as unjustified irrigation subsidies, low 
crop assessment and cost recovery, inequitable irrigation distribution and widespread 
corruption in all tiers of water management, emerged and caused the gradual 
deterioration of system infrastructure and efficiency [Bengali (2009); Faisal (2009); 
Memon (2006); Prathapar, et al. (2001)]. 
Concerning the situation, the World Bank stopped financing the engineering 
solutions and explored the possibility of institutional reforms. The idea was to reduce the 
discretionary power of water bureaucrats and subsequent corruption and mismanagement 
through the introduction of farmer-managed and participatory irrigation and drainage 
(I&D) system. Obviously, this transformation was easier said than done. The years of 
action research and policy dialogue finally yielded the Provincial Irrigation and Drainage 
Authorities Act in 1997 [Bandaragoda (2006); Dinar, et al. (2004)]. The act facilitated the 
formation of autonomous institutions at the different levels of irrigation management. 
Under the umbrella of the provincial authorities, Area Water Boards (AWBs) were to be 
established to manage the secondary level channels or canals. Below this, farmers were to 
be organised into Water User Associations (WUA) and Drainage Beneficiary Groups 
(DBGs) to form Farmer Organisations (FOs) and manage the distributary/minor or 
tertiary level I&D affairs [Memon (2006); Prathapar, et al. (2001)]. 
Sindh Province has been the second largest beneficiary of the irrigation development 
on the Indus River. The provincial irrigation facility itself stands as one of the largest 
contiguous irrigation networks in the world (Figure 1). The provincial system irrigates 
about five million hectare of farmlands through 14 canals, 1,446 distributaries/ minors and 
45,000 watercourses [Memon (2006)]. Besides, the system also features about 3,690 
kilometres of drains. Since the last 15 years, the province has been implementing irrigation 
and drainage sector reforms. The provincial cabinet approved the Sindh Irrigation and 
Drainage Act in 1997 and replaced it with the Sindh Water Management Ordinance 2002 to 
accelerate the implementation of the reforms [Sindh Governor House (2002)]. This study 
evaluates the extent to which these reforms could be implemented and highlights some of 
the emerging issues in this process. The next section describes the data sources and methods 
and is followed by the result section highlighting the major achievements towards the 
reforms. The final section discusses key findings in the broader theoretical and policy 
context to draw the conclusions and make policy recommendations. 
 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1.  Study Approach 
At first, the broad indicators of progress in the implementation of reforms were 
qualitatively analysed. Subsequently, we focused on the three AWBs, namely, NC-AWB, 
GC-AWB and LBC-AWB, due to the fact that so far the implementation of reforms in 
Sindh Province has been limited to those areas. The emerging trends in the 
implementation were highlighted through the descriptive statistical analysis of FO 
profiles. The reasons for those trends were inquired through in-depth interviews 
conducted with the purposively selected respondents.  
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Fig. 1.  Irrigation Network of Sindh Province of Pakistan 
 
 
2.2.  Data Sources 
SIDA is primarily responsible for the implementation of proposed institutional 
reforms in the I&D sector of Sindh Province. In 2009, the agency published a one-page 
profile of 354 FOs in Sindh Province. Since then, the profile has never been updated as 
there has been hardly any progress in the FO formation. Data on key variables was 
extracted from those profiles and was processed for descriptive analysis. Face to face and 
telephonic interviews were conducted with the SIDA, AWB and Water Sector 
Improvement Project (WISP) officials in order to explore the reasons behind the 
emerging trends. Besides, formal and informal discussions with some of the Management 
Committee members of FOs were also insightful in understanding the underlying factors 
responsible for the overall state of reform implementation. 
 
3.  RESULTS 
 
3.1.  Overall Implementation of Institutional Reforms 
Despite years of action research by the International Water Management Institute 
(IWMI) and subsequent implementation by SIDA, the I&D reforms in Sindh Province are 
still immature (Table 1). As a precondition for the take-over of reforms, the SIDA has 
been established and made operational since 1998. It was pursuing its mission to 
decentralise the irrigation and drainage management at the canal and distributary/minor 
levels. The SIDA was also functioning as the ‘Regulatory Authority,’ as the 
establishment of such institution has been pending since the promulgation of Sindh Water 
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Management Ordinance 2002 [SWMO (2002)]. So far only three AWBs, namely, the 
Nara Canal, the Ghotki Feeder Canal and the Left Bank Canal (Figure 1), could be 
established against the plan of establishing 14 AWBs on all canals throughout the 
Province by 2008. On account of FO formation, progress was conditional to the 
establishment of AWBs. At the provincial level, only one fourth of the total targets of 
FOs formations could be achieved while the progress in terms of actual Irrigation and 
Management Transfer to FOs was less than one fifth of the targets (Table 1). Most of the 
progress towards FO formation and IDMT was observed in the above-mentioned three 
AWBs (Table 1 and Table 2). The NC-AWB was the only subsystem where the targets of 
management transfer were almost complete. It worth mentioning that the Nara Canal had 
been the pilot AWB in Sindh province where the action research carried out by IWMI 




Overview of the Implementation of Institutional Reforms in the Sindh Province 
Progress indicator Target and achievements Remarks 
- Formation of 
Provincial Irrigation  
and  Drainage 
Authority 
Sindh Irrigation and Drainage 
Authority have been formed to oversee 
the irrigation and drainage affairs at the 
provincial level. 
Complete. 
- Formulation of 
Regulatory Authority 
(RA) 
Appropriate formation is still awaited. 
Currently, SIDA is functioning as RA. 
Incomplete. RA 
is operational 
through an  ad 
hoc arrangement. 
- Formulation of 
AWBs 
Out of 13 AWBs, only three (Fig. 1. ) 
could be formed as of 2009. No 
progress has been made thereafter. 
23 % complete. 
- Formulation of FOs 
in AWBs 
Out of about 1,400 FOs, about 338 
have been formed in three AWBs 
namely: NC-AWB, GC-AWB and 
LBC-AWB. Beside some 16 FOs has 
also been formed in the canal 
commands where irrigation reforms are 
yet to be implemented and AWBs are 
to be established. 
25 % complete. 
- Irrigation  and  
Drainage 
Management 
Transfer (IDMT) to 
FOs 
Out of 359, about 259 FOs have been 
transferred irrigation and drainage 
management responsibility. About 94% 
FOs of NC-AWB, 38% FOs of GC-
AWB and 60% FOs of LBC-AWB had 
been transferred the irrigation 
management responsibility of their 
minors and distributaries. 
For three AWBs, 
the target is 73 % 
complete. At the 
provincial level, 
only 18 % 
complete. 
Note: Calculations are based on FO Profile 2009. No substantial progress in FO formation thereafter. 
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Most of the FOs of NC-AWB were formed during 2000-2003 and were handed 
over the management responsibility during 2001-2004 and in 2008 (Table 2). In GC-
AWB and LBC-AWB, most of the FOs were formed during 2005-2008. However, the 
FOs in GC-AWB and LBC-AWB were bestowed with the responsibility of managing 
their channels during 2007-2008 and 2006-2008, respectively (Table 2). Besides these 
three AWBs, some FOs were also formed haphazardly in the command areas of other 
canals (secondary level channels) which were still not handed over to the SIDA for the 
establishment of AWBs and FOs. In total, about 16 such FOs were formed outside the 
jurisdictions of the three AWBs of which only one could be transferred the management 
responsibility till the time this study completed (Table 2). 
 
Table 2 
AWB Wise Details of FO Formation and Irrigation and  
Drainage Management Transfer 
 Year 
NC-AWB GC-AWB LBC-AWB other AWBs 
Formed IDMT Formed IDMT Formed IDMT Formed IDMT 
1998 2 - - - - - - - 
1999 5 - - - - - - - 
2000 17 - - - - - 3 - 
2001 12 24 - - 1 - 4 - 
2002 94 54 5 - 5 - 2 - 
2003 25 48 6 - 7 11 - - 
2004 5 16 - 11 - 2 - - 
2005 - - 3  7 - - - 
2006 - - 18 - 27 14 1 - 
2007 1 - 46 5 38 19 5 - 
2008 - 18 6 12 4 15 1 1 
2009 - - - - 3 - - - 
 Total 161+1
a
 160 84 28 92 61 16 1 
Notes: a.Value for one case is missing. 
- Figures in the table are the numbers of FOs. 
 
The achievements in FO formation were mostly the outcome of various projects 
implemented by SIDA and voluntary contributions of various government and non-
government organisations (Table 3). The credit for FO formation till 2000 goes to the 
IWMI under the World Bank financed Left Bank Outfall Drain Project (LBOD) and the 
Directorate of OFWM (Agriculture Department, Government of Sindh) for their 
voluntary contributions. However, most of the FO formation is attributed to the SIDA 
and OFWM under the National Drainage Programme (NDP) during 2002-2007, also 
sponsored by the World Bank. Meanwhile, the World Bank also sponsored the Sindh On-
farm Water Management Project. This project also had a component dealing with the FO 
formation—that too was implemented by the OFWM. Besides those formal and 
sponsored attempts, some local and international NGOs, such as OXFAM and SWAFCO, 
have also formed FOs in the NC-AWB and outside the command areas of the three 
AWBs (Table 3). 
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Table 3 
Different Agencies Involved in FO Formation During the Years 1998–2009 









SIDA 47 48 44 8 147 
On-farm Water Management (OFWM) 79 36 48 5 168 
SIDA and OFWM Jointly 23 - - - 23 
International Water Management Institute 11 - - 1 12 
Other NGOs such as OXFAM, SWAFCO 1 - - 2 3 
Total  161 84 92 16 353+1a 
Notes:  
      a Missing values.  
   – Figures in the table are the number of FOs. 
-  
3.2.  Composition of Farmer Organisations 
Since irrigation right in Pakistan is a proxy to farmland ownership, all those who 
have possessed or leased any farmland in the command area of a channel were by default 
the members of its FO. Thus, the membership size of a FO or its constituting WUAs was 
the function of the command area that its respective irrigation channel was designed to 
serve. On average, a FO of NC-AWB had 280 farmers/members out of which about 24 
were women farmers. In GC-AWB and LBC-AWB, although the average number of 
farmers/members was substantially higher than that of the NC-AWB, but the number of 
woman farmers/members was considerably less or even negligible. The average 
landholding per farmer in a FO of three AWB ranged between nine and 13 hectares but 
the distribution of land was quite skewed towards the privileged small number of farmers. 
The average landholding of the smallest farmer in any of the FO was not more than five 
hectares while the average landholding of the largest landholder could be as high as 100 
hectares in NC-AWB, 85 hectares in GC-AWB and about 175 hectares in LBC-AWB. 
 
Table 4 
Characteristics of FO Membership in Three AWBs of Sindh Province 
Salient Features of FOs’ Membership 
NC-AWB GC-AWB LBC-AWB 
   SD n*    SD n*    SD n* 
Farmers/Members (Person) 280 231 161 347 400 72 347 383 78 
Women Farmers/Members (Person) 24 36 100 5 5 20 9 11 26 
Land Holding per Farmer (ha) 13.0 10.7 159 9.4 7.5 70 11.9 7.4 77 
Land of the Smallest Landholder (ha) 2.8 2.5 160 2.5 2.7 84 4.7 22 91 
Land of the Largest Landholder (ha) 97.8 84.5 160 84.3 106 84 176 230 91 
Notes: 
* The number of cases valid in the calculation of    s   ‘  ’ is the arithmetic mean and ‘SD’ is standard 
de iation while ‘n’ is the number of cases  alid for the calculation of     
- Calculations are based on FO Profile 2009. There is no substantial progress in FO formation after 2009. 
 
3.3.  Institutional Attributes of Farmer Organisations 
A complete transformation from the state-to a farmer-managed irrigation system 
could only be observed in the case of NC-AWB (Table 5). The majority of the FOs in 
NC-AWB was near to complete the second tenure of their MCs while a few of the FOs 
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had already started the third tenure. In GC-AWB and LBC-AWB, the majority of the FOs 
was still going through the first tenure of their MCs (Table 5) mostly because FOs in 
these AWBs were formed relatively recently (Table 2). However, while comparing the 
FOs of GC-AWB and LBC-AWB which were formed during the same time (Table 2), the 
percentage of FOs in their second tenure was much higher for the GC-AWB than the 
LBC-AWB. This defect appears to be a function of unknown status of MC tenures of 14 
percent FOs of the LBC-AWB (Table 5). When specifically inquired about the exact 
reason behind the unknown status of the MC tenure of some FOs, it was revealed that 
their re-election was pending due to a severe conflict among farmer groups. 
Unfortunately, neither the SIDA nor the respective AWBs could play any successful role 
in the resolution of the conflicts over re-election. 
 
Table 5 








FOs signed IDMT Agreement 98.8 45.2 65.2 
Tenure of FO Management Committees    
- 1st tenure – 79.8 75.0 
- 2nd tenure 92.6 19.0 10.9 
- 3rd tenure 0.6 – – 
- Status unknown 6.8 1.2 14.1 
The Largest Landholder of a FO in MC 39.8 35.7 32.6 
The Smallest Landholder of a FO in MC 17.4 20.2 20.7 
Women Farmers in MC 1.8 1.2 – 
Notes: 
- Figures in the table are percentages. 
- Calculations are based on FO Profile 2009. There is no substantial progress in FO formation after 2009. 
 
From the information given in the FO Profiles 2009, the participation of three 
farmer groups, namely, woman farmers, the smallest farmers and the largest farmers, in 
the FO management committees can be analysed. It could be observed that two- fifth of 
the largest landlords of the FOs in NC-AWB, one third of the largest landlords in the FOs 
of GC-AWB and LBC-AWB were MC members of their respective FOs (Table 5). Most 
of the largest farmers in FOs across all AWBs, who were members of MCs, were either 
Chairmen or other important office-bearers and only a few of them were just the 
members (Table 6). Compared to the largest landholders, the participation of the smallest 
landholder in the MCs of FOs was in much lesser numbers. In all three AWBs, only 
about 20 FO management committees had the participation of the smallest landholders 
(Table 5). Most of the smallest landholders, who were in the MC of their FOs, were just 
members while a few of them could be found holding the offices of a chairman, vice 
chairman, secretary and treasurers (Table 6). It can be further observed that the 
composition of FO management committees was quite masculine. Compared to the 
percentage of women landholders in FO general bodies across all AWBs (Table 4), their 
participation in the MCs was negligible or completely missing. Only four women could 
be found bearing an office, three of whom were in the NC-AWB while only one in the 
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GC-AWB. None of the office-bearers was found to be a chairwoman (Table 6). In NC-
AWB, three women were designated each as a Vice Chairwoman, General Secretary and 
Treasurer; while the only woman in GC-AWB was just a member (Table 6). 
 
Table 6 




Positions in FO management committees 
Chair V. Chair G. Sec Treasurer Members 
NC-AWB (n=161)       
- Women farmer 98.2 – 0.6 0.6 0.6 – 
- Smallest farmer 79.5 0.6 3.7 3.1 3.1 9.9 
- Largest farmer 57.8 23.0 8.1 4.3 3.1 3.7 
GC-AWB (n=84)       
- Women 98.8 – – – – 1.2 
- Smallest farmer 78.6 3.6 2.4 3.6 1.2 10.7 
- Largest farmer 64.3 22.6 6.0 1.2 1.2 4.8 
LBC-AWB (n=92)       
- Women farmers – – – – – – 
- Smallest farmer 79.3% 1.1 4.3 3.3 2.2 9.8 
- Largest farmer 65.2 14.1 1.1 5.4 4.3 9.8 
Notes: 
- Figures in the table are percentages. 
- Calculations are based on FO Profile 2009. There is no substantial progress in FO formation thereafter. 
 
4.  DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Although the need for water sector reforms has been uniform across various 
countries, the underlying causes, the cost of implementation and a certain degree of 
success in achieving the stated objectives varied across different socio-political and 
geographical contexts [Dinar, et al. (2004)]. In the case of Pakistan, improper O&M of 
irrigation infrastructure, low crop assessment and revenue collection, inequitable water 
distribution and corruption in water bureaucracy were compelling reasons behind the 
I&D sector reforms [Memon (2006)]. Nevertheless, like other South Asian countries, the 
design of reforms and push for their persuasion mainly came from the World Bank 
having a major role in the post-independence irrigation development in the country 
[Bandaragoda (2006)]. Given the fact that the demand for reforms was not internally 
generated by users and managers of irrigation facilities [Bandaragoda (2006)], the 
findings of this study revealed that the prescriptions were implemented half-heartedly. 
The establishment of SIDA was a cosmetic step that partially transformed the Provincial 
Irrigation Department and created a parallel institution that was made responsible for the 
implementation of a farmer-managed irrigation system. After the initial hike, not much 
progress has been made. So for, the farmer-managed irrigation system is confided to NC-
AWB, GC-AWB and LBC AWBs and could not encompass the remaining 11 canals in 
the province. By the year 2000, the Government of Sindh had already notified five canals 
to be brought under a farmer-managed irrigation system. Nevertheless, the Irrigation 
Department continues to operate the Begari Sindh and the Western Sindh canals and 
never transferred these two to the SIDA for the establishment of AWBs and the 
introduction of a farmer-managed irrigation model. 
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Even in the AWBs, where the SIDA was able to implement reforms, the process 
had been quite slow and grinding to halt as no major achievement has been made since 
2009. Over the last 15 years, the SIDA could not establish any mechanism to ensure the 
democratic election of the members of AWB for any of the three canals where the system 
has been implemented so far. The operations of these AWBs were in the hands of 
politically installed feudal lords without having any representation of the farmers at large. 
Besides, the FO formation and management transfer was still incomplete in GC-AWB 
and LBC-AWB and will certainly require decades to complete for the remaining canals at 
the current pace of implementation. Surprisingly, despite knowing that reforms were 
supply-driven [Bandaragoda (2006)] and a lengthy process, SIDA had not established any 
programme-level staff for social mobilisation, FO formation or post transfer management 
support to newly created FOs.  
So far, most of the FO formation had been project-based, done either through the 
project staffs of SIDA or by outsourcing other governmental and non-governmental 
agencies. Evidences suggest the large landholders, who were one of the reasons for the 
failure of the state-managed irrigation system in the province, had already captured the 
management committees of FOs by implanting either themselves or their proxies on the 
key positions of MCs. Although such a tendency on the part of the large landholders 
could have its roots in the skewed power distribution in rural Sindh, another reason, as 
narrated by some of the Social Mobilisers, could be the project-based approach of FO 
formation persuaded by the SIDA and AWBs. According to them, their supervisors 
compelled them to meet the targets of FO formation by implicitly compromising over the 
quality of social mobilisation for farmer participation and capacity building. Upon the 
condition of anonymity, many of the social organisers confessed that they sought out help 
from influential landlords and politicians in the formation of FOs in exchange for the 
selection of MC members at their will. 
Another major concern that had been missing from the debate on institutional 
reforms was the total ignorance of drainage affairs throughout the implementation of 
the reforms. Such an observation was particularly valid for the low-lying topography of 
NC-AWB and LBC-AWB, where the farmers highly acknowledge the importance of 
the drainage network in maintaining the fertility of their farmlands. It was gathered that 
almost half of the FOs in both of NC-AWB and GC-AWBs had some form of drainage 
structures such as surface and tube well and tile drains. However, virtually none of 
those FOs had formed any DBG for managing their drainage structures. Farmer 
organisations were reluctant to take over the responsibility of drainage management in 
purview of the payment of drainage levy [Official Correspondent Daily Dawn (2004)]. 
Since the government was not generating any revenue from the drainage facility, it 
ignored O&M of these structures until absolutely inevitable. As a result, the state of 
drainage structures was indeed miserable characterised by the chocked drains and non-
functional tube-wells. It was virtually in a state what the major theorist of Commons 
Pool Resources have explained as an open access resource [Berkes and Farvar (1989); 
Schlager and Ostrom (1992)] or an unmanaged common [Hardin (1968, 1994, 1998)]—
where everybody was a beneficiary but nobody was bearing the management 
responsibility. 
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To a neutral observer, the existing state of the implementation of institutional 
reforms in Sindh Province was not much surprising. Surprising, however, was the fact 
that policy makers ignored or perhaps concealed some of the major findings of the action 
research carried out by IWMI under the LBOD Project. For example, Murray-Rust et al 
(2001) found that FO formation was possible, but the sustainability of such institutions 
was unclear since none of the FOs was handed over the responsibility of O&M of their 
irrigation channels till the project ended. Besides warnings that the well-established 
hydraulic bureaucracy could impede the success PIM, Murray-Rust, et al. (2001) and 
Bandaragoda, et al. (1997) found it unrealistic to assume that the large farmers, for whom 
control over irrigation was the key to remain advantageous in the local power structure, 
could relinquish it in favour of the marginalised farmers. Similarly, other initial studies 
conducted by the IWMI research team [Bandaragoda and Memon (1997); Bandaragoda, 
et al. (1997)] and others [Mustafa (2002a); Mustafa (2002b)] also identified various 
caveats in the implementation of reforms such as rivalries of the hydraulic bureaucrats 
against institutional reforms, the possibility of feudal lords and politicians capture and 
chances of corruption among FO leaders. Nevertheless, perhaps the donor push was 
strong enough to compel the policy-makers to ignore these caveats and pick up only those 
conclusions which suggested the viability of the PIM within the socio-political context of 
Sindh Province. 
One of the SIDA officials who had been an instrumental advocate of reforms 
expressed his frustration as, “the inception of reforms shook the roots of a century-old 
water bureaucracy in Sindh; however, it is the fact of today that over the time the water 
bureaucracy has sustained those shocks and has re-emerged as a major threat to the 
reforms ” It is perhaps the peak time for the policy makers to revisit the design of reforms 
before continuing the failed path of their implementation persuaded so far. Despite the 
unsatisfactory progress so far, the lessons learned could serve as the guiding principles 
for setting the future directions of water management policies. Undoubtedly, it requires 
more research, particularly in evaluating the performance of FOs against the stated 
objectives of equitable irrigation distribution, maintenance of channels and cost recovery. 
Besides, it is also necessary to re-evaluate the prospect of PIM in the context of local 
power structure, factors determining the willingness of water bureaucracy to support the 
institutional reforms and the capacity and willingness of farmers to manage the system. 
Understanding of such dimensions will provide new insights and policy input for the re-
design of reforms and address some of the key obstacles in their implementation. 
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